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ABSTRACT 
This paper constructs a microeconomic model of the motivation for remittances and uses 
it to explore the macroeconomic determinants. In addition, a new measure of bilateral 
remittances is used to estimate a gravity model of remittances for 27 Latin American and 
Caribbean countries and 18 industrialised countries. The results suggest remittances are 
motivated by a combination of altruism and self-interest, both of which are encapsulated 
by economic and non-economic variables.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Remittances are the second largest source of net financial flows to developing countries, 
exceeding external aid and net foreign direct investment in some countries.
1
 The total 
remittance receipts of US$588 billion to the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) 
countries over the period 1980 to 2010 make it the most important destination of 
remittances. In 2012 LAC migrants sent US$64 billion in remittances to their home 
countries and this is expected to reach US$84 billion in 2015 (WORLD BANK, 2012).
2
 
Mexico features among the top four remittance-receiving countries in the world and for 
the smaller LAC countries, the share of remittances in GDP is substantial: exceeding 20 
percent in Guyana, Haiti and Honduras and 15 percent in El Salvador, Jamaica, 
Nicaragua and Guatemala (WORLD BANK, 2011).. 
[Figure 1] 
Given the importance of remittances it is crucial for the governments and the 
financial sectors in the region to recognize the specificity of each kind of remittance. A 
systematic analysis of the determinants of remittances would provide invaluable insights 
to policy makers and contribute to the design of more appropriate regulations. This in 
turn can promote an effective strategy for the mobilisation of remittances. In this paper 
the macroeconomic determinants of remittances are estimated for a set of Latin American 
and Caribbean countries. Generally two approaches to modelling the determinants of 
remittances have been undertaken in the empirical literature. First a microeconomic 
approach utilising household survey data (DE LA BRIÈRE, 2002; AMUENDO-
DORANTES and POZO; 2006; YANG, 2008). Second a macroeconomic approach 
which uses balance of payments data (VARGAS-SILVA and HUANG, 2006; ADAMS, 
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2009). A third approach which combines a microeconomic foundation with 
macroeconomic data has been gaining some momentum (RAPOPORT and DOCQUIER, 
2005; SCHIOPU and SIEGFRIED, 2006). It is this latter approach upon which the 
current study is based.  
A panel data set of bilateral remittance flows from 18 industrialised remittance 
sending countries
3
 to 27 remittance receiving Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) 
countries
4
 over the period 1998 to 2007 is utilised to study the determinants of 
remittances. This paper makes several contributions to the literature on remittances.  
Generally research on remittances in the LAC region is concentrated on a single country 
or a minority of countries (SAYAN et al., 2010; VARGAS-SILVA and HUANG, 2006; 
CASTILLO-PONCE et al, 2011). A number of studies have used bilateral data to study 
remittances (LUETH and RUIZ-ARRANZ, 2008; FRANKEL, 2011; DOCQUIER et al, 
2012).  These studies feature selected Latin American countries as part of a larger data set 
that focuses on developing countries in general. In this study a new measure of bilateral 
remittances is proposed, one that is based on the assumption that aggregate remittance 
inflows for a country are directly linked to the pattern of a migrating population.  This 
makes it possible to derive bilateral estimates of remittances for a larger group of 
countries in the LAC region than has been available previously.   
Second, the effect on remittances is examined for a comprehensive set of 
economic, demographic and risk related factors (both man-made and natural). This is 
unlike earlier studies which tend to ignore the potential effects of demographic and/or 
risk related factors that may be important in capturing altruistic and investment 
motivations (VARGAS-SILVA and HUANG, 2006; LIN, 2011). Finally, microeconomic 
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theory provides the foundation for exploring the motives for remittances, which are then 
captured in a model comprising macroeconomic variables. Previous macroeconomic 
studies of remittances tend to utilise a reduced form equation for remittance with little or 
no reference to the underlying microeconomic foundations (HIGGINS et al, 2009; 
FONCHAMYO, 2012; LIM and MORSHED, 2014). These contributions collectively 
make for a useful and important step in advancing the literature on remittances. 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 the theoretical model is presented. 
The linkages between the motives to remit and macroeconomic variables are discussed in 
section 3. The econometric specification of the gravity model of remittances is presented 
in Section 4. Section 5 describes how the new measure of bilateral remittances is 
constructed. Section 6 discusses the results and Section 7 concludes. 
2. THEORETICAL MODEL 
Generally microeconomic models of remittances are based on the motives to remit: 
altruism and self interest (LUCAS and STARK; 1985). Altruism relates to an individual’s 
desire to improve the income and well being of family members while self-interest 
remittances are motivated by potential for future benefits. Other microeconomic studies 
argue that self interest motivated remittances may take the form of reimbursement to 
relatives back home for the cost migration and/or education abroad (POIRINE, 1997; 
ILAHI and JAFAREY, 1999). In this case there is an implicit loan agreement between 
the migrant and relatives back home. Remittances may also be perceived as an insurance 
or risk diversification device which protects against future uncertainties, (AGARWAL 
and HOROWITZ, 2002) crises and/or income shocks (YANG and CHOI, 2007).  
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In order to explicitly illustrate the altruistic and self interest motives for 
remittances a simple stylized model is developed similar to that of SCHIOPU and 
SIEGFRIED (2006) and RAPOPORT and DOCQUIER (2005). The model provides a 
rigorous justification for some of the a priori relationships discussed later and is the 
foundation of the macroeconomic model estimated subsequently. There are two periods. 
A migrant from home country j  now living in country i  has per-period utility function 
u , which for simplicity is given by ( ) lnu x x . The migrant's overall utility depends on 
their first-period consumption 1
iC , second period consumption 2
iC , and the family's 
consumption 1
jC : 
1 2 1( ) [ ( )] ( ),
i i ju C u C u C  E   
  
 
where [0,1]    is the discount factor, [0,1]   is the degree of altruism, and 2[ ( )]
iu CE is 
the discounted expected utility from second-period consumption.  
In the first period the migrant works in country i  and earns income iI  which can 
be allocated to first-period consumption, savings S , or remittances to the home 
country ijX . In order for an amount ijX  to reach the migrant's family ijX must 
be spent, where 1   represents the cost of remittances. The migrant's family 
spends all its income jI , as well as any remittances it receives, on first-period 
consumption. Out of savings, the migrant invests an amount iA  in a safe host-
country asset with a return 0iR   and an amount jA  in a risky home-country 
asset, which has a return of 0jR   with probability p  and zero return with 
probability1 p . The migrant's portfolio allocation sub-problem is 
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As long as the expected return from the risky asset is higher than from the safe asset, 
i jpR R  , the migrant will invest a positive amount in each asset. Given S , the optimal 
portfolio is  
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The migrant will invest more in the risky asset the higher is its return, the lower the 
probability of no return, and the lower the return on the safe asset. Given the optimal 
asset portfolio, the consumption choice is now  
1
1 1
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As long as the migrant is sufficiently altruistic, the cost of remittances is sufficiently low, 
or the income differential is high enough,
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 transfers to the migrant’s family are positive 
and the optimal levels of remittances and investment in the home country asset are  
(1 ) ( ) ( )ˆˆ , .
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i j j i i j
ij j
j i
I I pR R I I
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Altruism is captured by ijXˆ , self interest by jAˆ . By adding the two types of transfers, the 
following expression is obtained for total remittances (REMITij) from host country i  to 
home country j :  
 
(1 ) ( ) ( )ˆˆ
(1 ) 1
i j j i i j
ij j
ij j i
I I pR R I I
REMIT X A
R R
    
    
   
   
    
 (1) 
 
The migrant's remittances to relatives in the home country depend positively on the 
migrant's income, and negatively on the family's income. The migrant’s remittances for 
investment depend positively on the migrant’s and the family’s income and on the 
interest rate in country j , and depends negatively on the interest rate in country i . Also, 
the less risky is the home-country asset (the higher p ) the more is invested in this asset. 
In general the effect of a change in the migrant’s family’s income or the cost of 
remittances is ambiguous.
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  These comparative static effects are summarized below: 
),,,,,(
// 
 pRRIIfREMIT jijiij      (2) 
3. MICROECONOMIC MOTIVES AND MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES 
This section explains how the microeconomic motives summarized in equation (2) can be 
captured by macroeconomic variables. Following research by KATSELI and GLYTSOS 
(1986) and EL-SAKKA and MCNABB (1999) gross domestic product (GDP) in the host 
and home countries is used to proxy migrant and family income. The returns in home and 
host country assets may be captured by the home and host countries’ deposit or lending 
interest rates. In the literature this is often captured by the interest rate differential 
between the home and host countries (FAINI, 1994; EL-SAKKA and MCNABB, 1999).  
The cost of remitting is difficult to calculate in a macroeconomic study; one way to deal 
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with this problem is to use a proxy, for example, the distance between the home and host 
country (LUETH and RUIZ-ARRANZ, 2008; FRANKEL, 2011). 
An examination of the comparative static results obtained in section 2, shows that 
a higher level of income in the host country stimulates a higher level of remittances while 
a lower level of income in the home country may attract more or less remittances 
depending on whether the altruistic of self-interest motive is dominant. Also, a relatively 
high interest rate in the home country (which reflects the profitability of home-country 
assets) will motivate self-interest remittances; while greater distances increases the cost 
of remitting and so reduces remittances.  
Altruism and self-interest motives to remit can be captured by macroeconomic 
variables other than the ones that already appear in equation (2). In order to facilitate this, 
the model is extended to incorporate additional variables including core gravity model 
variables, for example the exchange rate and credit availability. An increase in total 
remittances due to an appreciation in the host country’s currency reflects the self-interest 
motive as migrants seek to benefit from the currency gain whereas a decrease reflects the 
altruistic motive as a lower level of remittances is needed to support the same standard of 
living in the home country (AMUEDO-DORANTES et al., 2010; LIN, 2011). Credit 
availability is an indicator of overall development of a country. If remittances are profit-
driven, increased credit availability signals financial deepening in the home country, 
which attracts self-interest remittances. If remittances are instead influenced by altruism, 
increased availability of credit at home reduces the need for remittances from abroad 
(LUETH and RUIZ-ARRANZ, 2008; AREZKI and BRÜCKNER, 2011).
7
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In our model, self-interest is captured through remittances for investment. A 
second type of self interest indentified in the literature is the inheritance motive. At the 
macro level, the inheritance motive may be captured by the difference in the level of 
skills between the home and host countries and the family size. This is because the high 
skilled migrants may have less intention to return home and hence reduces the desire to 
add to family assets in order to buy into future returns. (BOLLARD et al, 2011). Another 
variable that captures the inheritance motive is the relative dependency ratio. A positive 
sign indicates that that the dominant motive is altruism as higher number of dependents in 
the home country (relative to the host country) stimulates foreign financial support 
(ARVIN and LEW, 2012; FONCHAMYO, 2012). A negative sign means in the presence 
of higher home country dependency ratio, remittances is falling; one way of rationalising 
this behaviour is that higher dependency ratios have a dampening effect on the 
inheritance motive and hence discourage remittances. 
Finally the insurance hypothesis can be tested by including risk variables. A 
positive effect sign is consistent with the insurance hypothesis as migrants seek to 
complement the income of relatives back home in challenging economic times, while an 
inverse relationship is indicative of the more general self-interest motivated as investors 
flee the country (AGARWAL and HOROWITZ, 2002).  
4. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Given the discussion in the section above the model for remittances can now be written in 
the following form:  
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  t          (3) 
 
t
ijREMIT  is a measure of bilateral remittance flows from country i  to country j  
(discussed in Section 5). The intercept is denoted 0 , the time specific effects, 
t and tij  
is the error term. All variables are estimated in natural logarithms except for the dummies 
and the dependency ratio. A definition of the variables and data sources is provided in the 
Appendix.  
The model includes the economic size of both countries ( tiGDP  and 
t
jGDP  
respectively); in line with the gravity model a variable to represent the absolute difference 
in GDP per capita income levels ( tj
t
i
t
ij GDPPCGDPPCDGDPPC lnln  ) is also 
included. A positive coefficient means that greater disparities between countries’ 
development levels stimulate remittances and reinforces the altruistic motive, whereas a 
negative relationship reinforces the self-interest motivation for remitting (SCHIOPU and 
SIEGFRIED, 2006).  
Three sets of variables capturing altruistic and self-interest motives of remittances 
are included. The first set represents economic conditions and includes the real interest 
rate differential, )ln(ln ti
t
j
t
ji INTINTDINT  , the real exchange rates for both countries 
( tiRER  and 
t
jRER ) as well as private sector credit as a share of GDP (
t
iCREDIT  and 
t
jCREDIT )  
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Demographics comprise a further set of variables: the relative skills level, 
)ln(ln tj
t
i
t
ij SKILLSKILLDSKILL  ; the relative age dependency ratio, 
)( ti
t
j
t
ji DEPENDDEPENDDDEPEND   and an interaction term, 
)( tji
t
ij DDEPENDDSKILL  . The last term accounts for the possibility that migrants remit 
more when the sending country has a higher skills base and a lower age dependency ratio. 
Third a set of risk-related variables is also included. Natural disasters 
( tjDISASTER ) refer to 11 separate dummies for biological disasters, climatic disasters, 
geophysical disasters, and other large scale disasters. The international risk perception 
index, tjRISK , is a composite index comprising 12 indicators of political risk.  
The last group of variables is comprised of three dummy variables in a manner 
similar to LUETH and RUIZ-ARRANZ, (2008). These are intended to capture the ties 
between two countries. The greater are these ties the greater is the probability that an 
individual will migrate to this country than other potential host country. In the case of 
Latin America, being adjacent ( ijADJ ) to the Mexican border is likely to increase 
remittances because travel costs are lower; movement from one country to another can 
take place more quickly and with less difficulty and the propensity for unofficial cross 
border money transfers increases. Second, a common language ( ijLANG ) is expected to 
enhance remittances - migrants who speak the same language will secure employment 
more easily. Finally, a shared history of colonial ties ( ijCOL ) may mean that the coloniser 
has contributed to the state of the institutions of the colonised. It may be easier for 
citizens of the colony to travel to the coloniser or there may be political ties. The 
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summary statistics for all variables are shown in Table 1. A correlation matrix of the 
independent variables is shown in Table 2.  
 
[Tables 1 and 2] 
5. MEASUREMENT OF BILATERAL REMITTANCES 
Bilateral data on remittances are, in general, not available. On the assumption that the 
patterns of remittances received by the LAC countries are linked to the patterns of LAC 
migrant population outflows to the industrialised countries, a measure of bilateral 
remittances can be calculated. Let ijR  represent the level of remittance flows from 
country i  (for i  = 1, 2, …, n) to country j . It follows that the total level of remittances 
to country j  can be written as the sum of the individual remittances from all countries:  
njjj
n
i
ij RRRR 

...21
1
 
                 
(4) 
Rewriting equation (4) in shares gives: 
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(5) 
where each term on the left hand side (LHS) of equation (5) is the proportion of 
remittances received by country j  that originates in country i .  
Similarly, let jiM  be the level of migrant population flows from country j  to 
country i  (for i  = 1, 2, …, n), hence the total migrant population flows from country j  
can be represented as the sum of migrant flows from country j  to all other countries: 
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Rewriting equation (6) in terms of shares gives:  
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(7) 
where each LHS term in equation (7) is the proportion of migrants in country i  that 
originates from country j .  
Assuming that the share of bilateral remittance flows from country i  to country j  
is equivalent to the share of migrant population flows from country j  to country i  gives:  

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From this, a measure of bilateral remittance flows from country i  to country j  can be 
calculated as the product of the total remittances received by country j  and the share of 
migrant population flows from country j  to country i : 





n
i
ji
ji
n
i
ijij
M
M
RR
1
1
 
                 
 
HARRISON et al. (2004) also assume a direct link between the patterns of 
migrating populations to a foreign country and remittances sent back to the home 
country. This assumption has two main caveats. First, not all people working in a foreign 
country are migrants. Second, remittances to the home country may be sent by people 
other than migrants in the foreign country. Nevertheless, HARRISON et al. (2004) 
suggest the existence of a direct migration remittance link on the grounds that remittances 
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tend to be sent by migrants abroad who send their earnings back to the country from 
which they have migrated.  
One way of exploring the validity of the assumption that the share of remittances 
to country j  from country i  is equivalent to the share of migrants from country j  to 
country i  is to look at bilateral data published by the Bank of Mexico. The correlation 
between the estimated remittances and official estimates of workers’ remittances from the 
US to Mexico (annualised monthly values) exceeds 0.95 (see Table 3), thus supporting 
the assumed remittance-migration approach.
8
 
[Table 3] 
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 4 presents the results from estimating variations of equation (3). The baseline 
model in column (1) shows the relationship between remittances and the core gravity 
variables. Country fixed effects for the sending and receiving countries are interacted 
with the time fixed effects and added to the pooled least squares regression to account for 
unobservable time varying variables across individual countries. Ramsey’s RESET test 
(RAMSEY 1969), while primarily used to test for functional form misspecification, can 
also be used to check whether the relationship between remittances and the explanatory 
variables is non-linear. The result reveals that the model in column (1) has omitted non-
linear variables. Because the specific nature of the omitted non-linear variables is 
unknown the model is re-estimated. In column (2) unobservable time varying fixed 
effects are replaced with time varying economic and demographic variables; risk factors 
are added in column (3). Following this, an LM test is performed to check for the joint 
significance of non-linear explanatory variables.
9
 In both cases the null hypothesis that 
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the coefficients are jointly equal to zero cannot be rejected and on this basis the models in 
their current form are accepted. The RE estimator is the preferred choice of estimator for 
these models given the results of both the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) 
statistic and the HAUSMAN (1978) test.  
GDP in both countries matters for remittances; countries with higher income send 
and receive larger volumes of remitted earnings. The positive coefficient on GDP in the 
home country is consistent with the investment motive for remittances. In contrast, the 
impact of the GDP per capita differential variable provides support for the altruistic 
motive. The distance elasticity is negative and significant, indicating that a higher cost of 
remitting reduces the volume of remittances.  
The enhancing effect on remittances of the Mexican border is significant across 
all specifications. Up to one million people cross the border legally as part of a day’s 
work and bring back economic benefits from US employment. Sharing a common 
language is also significant, while remittances to the LAC countries are unresponsive to 
colonial ties. This result conflicts with the findings of LUETH and RUIZ-ARRANZ 
(2008) who suggest that a colonial history is important because of the existence of 
preferential visa arrangements between the ‘mother’ countries and their former colonies. 
Such visa arrangements play a more limited role for the LAC countries, perhaps leading 
to more illegal migration. To a certain extent, the effect of a shared colonial history is 
captured by the language dummy (the correlation between the two dummies is 0.60), 
which is not surprising because a myriad of languages spoken in the advanced countries - 
Dutch, English, French, Spanish, and Portuguese - were transmitted abroad via colonial 
links and adopted in the LAC countries. 
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The real interest rate differential is significant at the 10 percent level in the full 
model specification and insignificant otherwise. In combination with the per capita 
income differential, these results suggest remittances are driven more by altruism than by 
self-interest. The real exchange rates are in significant in all models, while credit 
availability is a significant in the full model specification (column (3)). Credit availability 
in both the home and foreign countries is equally important for the investment motive of 
remittances.  
In terms of the demographic factors, both the skilled labour and dependency ratio 
differentials are statistically significant. Although the interaction term does not 
discriminate clearly between the motives to remit, its negative and significant coefficient 
suggests individuals, in an attempt to boost their potential earnings, migrate to countries 
with a relatively higher skills level accompanying a relatively lower age dependency 
ratio.   
Latin America has long been affected by natural disasters but remittances are 
sensitive to certain types only. Flooding (column 3), mass movements of water, and 
epidemics generate a favourable response from abroad. An exception to the altruistic 
nature of migrants, however, is the presence of extreme temperatures.
10
 Remittances from 
abroad tend to increase in times of political uncertainty; the positive and significant 
coefficient for political risk in the home country suggests the selfless motives of altruism 
and insurance prevail over the self-interest motive of investment. A more mixed picture 
emerges when the composite index for political risk is disaggregated into its 
subcomponents.
11
 Remittances increase during times of external conflict and military 
involvement in politics. In contrast, ethnic tensions reduce the volume of remittances, 
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reflecting either affordability issues which prevent the hedging of risks via a migration 
strategy or the withholding of profit driven remittances.  
Robustness checks are carried out on the preferred model specification (column 3, 
Table 4). First, four regional dummies (North America, Europe, Asia, and Oceania) are 
added to control for regional differences among the host countries. Along similar lines, 
YANG (2008) uses region-specific year effects to allow for time-varying factors common 
to all countries in the same region. As shown in column (1) of Table 5, three dummies are 
insignificant (Oceania is dropped because of multicollinearity), implying heterogeneity 
across regions is not a major issue. Second, as Mexico is by far the largest recipient of 
remittances among the LAC countries, the sensitivity of the results to its exclusion is 
investigated. As shown in column (2), the results are largely unaffected.   
 [Figure 2] 
The results may suffer from endogeneity bias arising from the simultaneous 
determination of remittances and the explanatory variables. One way of dealing with the 
endogeneity problem is to use instrumental variable (IV) techniques. For example, 
ADAMS (2009) uses distance and language to instrument for the skill level of migrants 
while HIGGINS et al (2004) uses the terms of trade to instrument for the real exchange 
rate. Other variables used as instruments include child characteristics (DE SOUZA and 
DUVAL, 2010), latitude, distance between origin and destination countries 
(BUGAMELLI and PATERNO, 2009), and geographic, political and cultural indicators 
(FRENKEL, 2010). Most of these variables have been explicitly incorporated in the 
model because they are expected to have a direct impact on remittances, while 
information for other variables, for example child characteristics, is not available.  
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Another common instrument is to use lagged regressors (AMUENDO-
DORANTES et al., 2010; AREZKI and BRÜCKNER, 2011; LIN, 2011). This is broadly 
the approach taken in this paper. First, the time-varying explanatory variables in equation 
(3) are lagged by one year. The results are shown in column (3) of Table 5. Second, in 
column (4) each variable (excluding dummy variables, natural disaster and distance) is 
instrumented by its lagged counterpart since these are orthogonal to the error and 
estimated using panel data two stage least squares (TSLS). The latitude of a country is 
also used as an additional instrumental variable (BUGAMELLI and PATERNO, 2009).  
The first-stage F statistic of excluded instruments on all first-stage regressions are in 
excess of 10 (the rule of thumb threshold recommended by Stock and Staiger (STAIGER 
and STOCK; 1997) to avoid concerns pertaining to weak instruments).12 The Anderson-
Rubin Wald F test tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the endogenous 
regressors in the structural equation are jointly equal to zero. The null is rejected. A 
further test of the relevancy of instruments, the Anderson canonical correlations test, 
rejects the null hypothesis so the instruments are deemed relevant. Since an additional 
instrument is included, the Sargan test for over-identified restrictions is applied. The null 
hypothesis, that the instruments are exogenous, cannot be rejected. On the basis of these 
diagnostics, the instruments are valid and the results in column 4 are accepted. 
Based on the results in columns (3) and (4) the core gravity variables remain 
significant, the coefficients for credit availability, the interaction term and political risk 
lose significance. The insignificant credit coefficients weaken the investment hypothesis. 
The insignificant interaction term suggests only the direct effects of skilled labour and the 
dependency ratio matter for remittances. The loss of significance for political risk 
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suggests altruism is a short-term phenomenon, prevailing in the current year only and not 
the previous year. That is, altruistic remitters behave in a strategic manner: remitting 
transfers during times of political uncertainty but saving transfers when political tensions 
subside. 
[Table 5]  
7. CONCLUSION 
This paper has developed a new measure of bilateral remittances to estimate the 
determinants of bilateral remittances from 18 industrialised countries to 27 LAC 
countries over the period 1998 to 2007 within a gravity model framework. The results 
suggest remittances to the LAC countries are motivated by both altruism and self-interest. 
Evidence in support of the former is indicated by the GDP per capita differential, the 
dependency ratio, several types of natural disasters and several types of political risks. 
Evidence in support of the latter is provided by the availability of credit and certain types 
of natural disasters and political risks. The core gravity variables and the demographic 
factors also contribute to the explanation of remittances to the LAC countries. Robustness 
tests, however, indicate a weakening of the respective motives over time. 
The results have several important policy implications. First, the negative 
coefficient on the distance variable (which is a proxy for the cost of remittances) suggests 
a twin policy of lower transaction costs and greater financial development in the LAC 
countries is necessary to foster remittances through formal channels. A similar conclusion 
had been arrived at in earlier research (ADAMS; 2009; PIRACHA and SARAGOI, 
2012). Reducing the cost of remitting increases a migrant’s disposable income and 
possibly investment in the home country. Remitters and recipients need to have access to 
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financial services such as savings instruments since a weak financial infrastructure 
impedes the transfer of remittances (through formal channels) and restricts the potential 
of remittances to spur development through investment. If remittances are to have a role 
beyond small business ventures, financial development is essential. 
Second, the differing results for the contemporaneous and lagged effects of 
political risk suggest migrant altruism might not endure over time. At some point there 
will be a levelling off and possibly a decline in remittances. This result should be of 
concern to those policy makers who see remittances as a stable source of revenue into the 
future. Economic strategies that focus on diversification are crucial for sustained 
economic development.   
Finally, the finite nature of future remittance inflows highlights the urgency of 
channelling remittances into their most productive uses; more needs to be done by both 
financial institutions and governments in order to maximise the development impact of 
remittances. 
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APPENDIX: DESCRIPTION OF DATA 
 Remittances are workers’ remittances and compensation of employees, in current US 
dollars (World Development Indicators (WDI)). Remittances comprise transfers by 
migrant workers and wages and salaries earned by non-resident workers. Remittances 
are deflated by US consumer prices (2000 = 100), taken from International Financial 
Statistics (IFS). Data on the inflows of foreign populations by nationality are from 
International Migration Statistics (IMS). The bilateral migration data refer to LAC 
migrant population inflows to the OECD countries; data for LAC migrant population 
outflows to the OECD countries are not available. 
 GDP for both countries (constant 2000 US dollars) are taken from WDI. 
 Distance, available from the CEPII, is the great circle distance measured in kilometres 
between the economic centres of the two countries. 
 GDP per capita (constant 2000 US dollars), sourced from WDI, is the absolute 
difference between the two countries’ per capita GDP levels.  
 Adjacency, from the CEPII, is a zero-one dummy denoting adjacent borders. 
 Language, from the CEPII, is a dummy for a shared official language.  
 Colony, from the CEPII, is a dummy for colonial links between two countries. 
 The real interest rate is the deposit rate adjusted for inflation, taken from WDI. 
 Exchange rate for both countries is the official exchange rate in local currency units 
per US dollar, sourced from WDI.  
 Credit for both countries refers to private sector credit as a share of GDP, from WDI. 
 Skilled labour refers to the enrolment rates in tertiary education, taken from WDI. 
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 Dependency ratio is the number of dependents (aged under 15 and above 65) as a 
ratio of the working age population (aged between 15 and 64), sourced from WDI. 
 Natural disasters refer to 11 separate dummies for biological disasters (epidemics 
and insect infestations), climatic disasters (droughts, extreme temperatures and 
wildfires), geophysical disasters (earthquakes, volcanoes and mass movements of 
earth) and other large scale disasters (storms, flooding and mass movements of water), 
all of which are constructed using information made available by EM-DAT. 
 Risk refers to the international perception of a country’s political risk rating, obtained 
from the International and Country Risk Guide (ICRG). This is a composite index 
comprising 12 indicators of political risk. 
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Table 1  Summary Statistics 
Variable  Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum  No. of obs 
Remittances  16.63 2.43 5.12 23.77 1344 
      
Host country GDP  27.02 1.32 24.58 30.07 4860 
      
Home country GDP  23.11 2.18 19.34 27.42 4860 
      
Distance  9.11 0.38 7.74 9.88 4860 
      
GDP per capita differential 2.12 0.81 0.17 4.69 4860 
      
Adjacency 0.21 × 10
–2
  0.04 0.00 1.00 4860 
      
Language 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 4860 
      
Colony 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00 4860 
      
Real interest rate differential 1.04 1.11 –6.24 6.52 3377 
      
Host country 
    real exchange rate  
5.59 1.95 3.90 11.83 4860 
      
Home country 
    real exchange rate  
7.20 2.36 4.19 14.62 4716 
      
Host country 
    private sector credit  
4.72 0.38 3.53 5.44 4671 
      
Home country 
    private sector credit   
3.53 0.60 2.13 4.78 4860 
      
Skills differential 0.97 0.60 –0.46 3.67 2048 
      
Dependency ratio  
    differential  
15.81 10.90 –6.11 53.90 4680 
      
Dependency ratio differential  
    × Skills differential 
15.48 19.98 –5.84 118.16 2048 
      
Flooding   0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 4860 
      
Political risk  64.80 8.58 38.00 82.50 3960 
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Table 2  Correlation Matrix
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Sending country GDP 1
Receiving country GDP 0.24 × 10
–2 1
Distance –0.26 0.19 1
GDP per capita differential 0.22 –0.26 –0.14 1
Adjacency 0.10 0.08 –0.13 –0.02 1
Language 0.06 –0.25 –0.20 –0.06 –0.02 1
Colony 0.06 0.46 × 10
–2 –0.06 –0.08 –0.01 0.60 1
Real interest rate differential 0.08 0.13 –0.02 –0.05 –0.06 –0.01 0.14 1
Sending country
     real exchange rate                                                         
0.07 –0.20 × 10–2 0.47 0.03 –0.02 –0.18 –0.15 –0.05 1
Receiving country 
     real exchange rate
–0.14 × 10–2 0.12 0.10 0.23 –0.63 × 10–2 –0.07 –0.16 × 10–2 0.04 0.02 × 10–2 1
Sending country 
     private sector credit                                                              
0.43 0.01 –0.26 0.16 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.14 0.04 –0.84 × 10–2 1
Receiving country 
     private sector credit                                                     
–0.07 × 10–2 –0.45 –0.03 –0.16 –0.05 0.13 0.01 0.08 0.01 × 10–2 –0.05 –0.57 × 10–2 1
Skills differential –0.09 –0.40 –0.24 0.40 0.05 0.13 –0.01 0.03 –0.06 0.1 –0.03 0.05 1
Dependency ratio differential 0.55 × 10
–2 –0.25 –0.01 0.37 –0.03 0.03 0.02 –0.03 0.15 –0.05 –0.08 –0.09 0.36 1
Dependency ratio differential 
     × Skills differential                                                    
–0.03 –0.38 –0.10 0.41 –0.97 × 10–2 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.05 –0.02 –0.04 –0.04 0.70 0.85 1
Natural disaster 0.62 × 10
–2 0.57 0.1 0.02 0.05 –0.17 –0.72 × 10–2 0.06 0.27 × 10–2 0.05 0.04 –0.23 –0.30 –0.10 –0.31 1
Risk –0.58 × 10–2 0.13 0.09 –0.53 0.04 –0.06 × 10–2 0.03 0.10 0.36 × 10–2 –0.04 –0.04 0.46 –0.22 –0.29 –0.25 –0.08 1
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Table 3 A Comparison of Bilateral Remittances from the US to Mexico (US$ million) 
Year  Estimated data Official data
a
 
1998 6.68 5.63 
1999 6.68 5.91 
2000 7.25 6.57 
2001 9.55 8.90 
2002 10.20 9.81 
2003 14.60 15.14 
2004 17.20 18.33 
2005 18.80 21.69 
2006   21.20 25.57 
2007 20.50 26.06 
a
 Source: Bank of Mexico.   
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Table 4  Model of OECD–LAC Remittance Flow Determinantsa  
Regressors  (1)          (2)           (3) Expected sign   
Host country GDP  
0.36*** 
(2.78) 
0.82*** 
(6.45) 
0.83** 
(6.47) 
(+) 
Home country GDP  
0.44** 
(3.62) 
1.05** 
(6.73) 
1.16** 
(8.49) 
(+) 
Distance  
–2.43** 
(–15.90) 
–1.46** 
(–3.53) 
–1.38** 
(–3.48) 
(–) 
GDP per capita differential 
0.36 
(1.28) 
1.15** 
(3.98) 
1.42** 
(4.84) 
altruism (+)  
investment (–) 
Adjacency 
2.22** 
(14.71) 
2.24** 
(4.55) 
1.97** 
(4.18) 
(+) 
Language 
1.42** 
(9.07) 
1.86** 
(2.48) 
2.68** 
(4.55) 
(+) 
Colony 
0.11 
(0.74) 
0.46 
(0.61) 
–0.23 
(–0.33) 
(+) 
Real interest rate differential – 0.06 
(1.15) 
0.08* 
(1.69) 
investment (+) 
Host country  real exchange rate  – –0.10 
(–0.85) 
–0.13 
(–1.12) 
altruism (+)  
investment (–) 
Home country   real exchange rate  – 0.06 
(1.07) 
0.09 
(1.57) 
altruism (–)  
investment (+) 
Host country  private sector credit  – –0.45** 
(–2.60) 
–0.43** 
(–2.65) 
altruism (+)  
investment (–) 
Home country private sector credit   – 0.58** 
(2.57) 
0.49** 
(2.39) 
altruism (–)  
investment (+) 
Skills differential – 1.34** 
(3.54) 
1.35** 
(3.56) 
altruism (+)  
investment (+) 
Dependency ratio differential  – 0.15** 
(4.77) 
0.16** 
(4.74) 
altruism (+) 
Dependency ratio differential  
    × Skills differential 
– –0.07** 
(–3.49) 
–0.06** 
(–3.16) 
altruism (–)  
investment (–) 
Natural disaster   – – 0.29** 
(2.33) 
altruism (+)  
investment (–) 
Political risk  – – 0.02** 
 (2.56) 
altruism (+)  
investment (–) 
Intercept 
15.94** 
(4.13) 
–24.27** 
(–2.98) 
–30.12** 
(–3.82) 
– 
No. of obs 1344 363 353 – 
No. of groups  – 110 106 – 
R
2
 0.919 0.724 0.775 – 
RMSE 0.826 – – – 
RESET
b
 7.60** – – – 
LM test
c
 – 251.37** 240.08** – 
Hausman
d
 – 7.10 12.82 – 
LM test
e
 (chi-squared(2))  
1.09 
(0.5812) 
4.05 
(0.1302) 
 
Time 3.39** 110.20** 116.91** – 
Time × Host country 8.02** – – – 
Time × Home country 2182.74** – – – 
a 
The test statistics in parentheses (z statistics for RE) are heteroskedasticity robust (White 1980).
b 
Ramsey’s 
(1969) RESET test for misspecification. 
c 
LM test for random effects (Breusch and Pagan 1980). 
d 
Test for 
the FE vs RE estimators (Hausman 1978). 
e
LM test for omitted non-linearities. ** and* denotes 
significance at the 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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 Table 5  Robustness of Model of OECD–LAC Remittance Flow Determinantsa    
Regressors (1)
a
 (2)
a
 (3)
a
 (4)
a
 
 Panel OLS (RE) Panel OLS (RE) Panel OLS (RE) Panel TSLS (RE) 
Host country GDP  
0.78** 
(4.67) 
0.84** 
(6.17) 
0.73** 
(7.14) 
0.76** 
(7.92) 
Home country GDP  
1.18** 
(9.19) 
1.17** 
(7.81) 
0.94** 
(8.65) 
0.89** 
(7.88) 
Distance  
–2.02** 
(–3.48) 
–1.33** 
(–3.06) 
–1.62** 
(–4.35) 
-1.68** 
(-5.05) 
GDP per capita differential 
1.53** 
(4.83) 
1.38** 
(4.30) 
1.03** 
(3.81) 
0.85** 
(2.35) 
Adjacency 
1.80** 
(3.89) 
– 1.92** 
(4.77) 
1.58* 
(1.70) 
Language 
2.58** 
(4.62) 
2.79** 
(4.72) 
2.09** 
(3.92) 
2.53** 
(8.08) 
Colony 
–0.20 
(–0.28) 
–0.34 
(–0.49) 
0.74 
(1.22) 
 
Real interest rate differential 
0.08 
(1.62) 
0.10* 
(1.86) 
–0.77 × 10–2 
(–0.14) 
 
Host country 
    real exchange rate  
–0.36 
(–1.56) 
–0.15 
(–0.97) 
–0.02 
(–0.25) 
-0.04 
(-0.52) 
Home country 
    real exchange rate  
0.09* 
(1.74) 
0.09 
(1.62) 
0.06 
(1.32) 
0.02 
(0.58) 
Host country 
    private sector credit  
–0.45** 
(–3.04) 
–0.45** 
(–2.68) 
–0.03 
(–0.14) 
0.06 
(0.11) 
Home country 
    private sector credit   
0.51** 
(2.54) 
0.50** 
(2.31) 
0.21 
(0.78) 
-0.31 
(-1.46) 
Skills differential 
1.35** 
(3.65) 
1.30** 
(3.21) 
0.82** 
(2.93) 
1.80** 
(4.90) 
Dependency ratio differential  
0.16** 
(4.41) 
0.16** 
(4.81) 
0.09** 
(2.82) 
0.22** 
6.45 
Dependency ratio differential  
    × Skills differential 
–0.06** 
(–3.28) 
–0.06** 
(–3.13) 
–0.03 
(–1.13) 
-0.12** 
(-5.14) 
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Table 5 cont’d 
Regressors (1)
a
 (2)
a
 (3)
a
 (4)
a
 
 Panel OLS (RE) Panel OLS (RE) Panel OLS (RE) Panel TSLS (RE) 
Natural disaster   
0.28** 
(2.29) 
0.29** 
(2.41) 
0.18** 
(2.32) 
0.18* 
(1.84) 
Political risk  
0.02** 
 (2.70) 
0.02** 
 (2.20) 
–0.49 × 10–2 
(–0.57) 
-0.03 
(-1.43) 
North America  
–0.89 
(–1.21) 
– –  
Europe   
–0.41 
(–0.83) 
– –  
Asia  
1.28 
(0.82) 
– –  
Oceania  – – –  
Intercept 
–22.36** 
(–2.34) 
–31.01** 
(–3.72) 
–16.63** 
(–2.38) 
-14.21** 
(-2.79) 
No. of obs 353 318 343 405 
Hausman
b 
   
19.65 
(0.478) 
No. of groups  106 96 100 105 
R
2
 0.750 0.700 0.785 0.810 
LM test
c
 168.02** 207.09** 276.84**  
Anderson-Rubin Wald F test
d 
   
27.78** 
(0.000) 
Anderson canonical correlations test
e 
   
110.22** 
(0.000) 
Sargan test
f 
   
1.25 
(0.2634) 
Time 87.73** 108.75** 102.36** 61.81** 
a 
The reported test statistics in parentheses (z statistics for RE) are heteroskedasticity robust (White 1980).  
b
Test for the FE vs RE estimators (Hausman 1978). 
c
LM 
test for random effects (Breusch and Pagan 1980). 
c
Test for instrument relevancy, it tests for the joint significance of all endogenous regressors. 
d
Test for instrument 
relevancy, the null hypothesis is that the minimum canonical correlation is zero (low/non relevance).  
f
Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions, the null hypothesis 
is that the instrument/s are exogenous. ** denotes significance at the 5% level; * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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Figure 1 Workers Remittances and Compensation of Employees  
Received in the LAC Countries
a
 
 
 
 
a 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.  
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Figure 2  Top-10 LAC Recipients of Remittances as at 2007 (US$ billion)
a
 
 
 
 
a 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.  
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NOTES 
                                                 
1
 Based on the authors’ own calculations. Data is taken from World Development Indicators, 
http://data.un.org/DataMartInfo.aspx#WDI. Data accessed 25/06/2015 
2
See http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2012/11/20/remesas-america-latina. Date 
accessed:07/05/2013 
3
 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States.   
4
 Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Haiti, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
5
Mathematically,
ji I)1(I   . 
6
 It can be shown that as long as   is small enough, the overall effect of an increase in jI  or   is 
negative. The condition (in conjunction with equation (1) is ]/)1)].[(RpR/()RR[( ijij    for 
which a sufficient condition is ]/)1[(    or simply 2 . 
7
It also depends on the cost of obtaining credit. 
8
 A similar correlation is found for Jamaica. 
9
 Models 3 and 4 are estimated and the fitted values obtained. These values are squared and cubed and 
subsequently added to the original model. The models without the fitted values are the restricted models 
and the ones with the fitted values are the unrestricted models. The joint significance of the fitted squared 
and cubed terms is then tested in the unrestricted models. The null hypothesis is that they are jointly equal 
to zero. Non-rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the restricted models (without non-linear terms) 
are acceptable.   
10
 The results for the components of natural disasters are available on request.    
11
 The results for the components of political risk are available on request.    
12
 The interest rate variable is dropped because the first stage F statistic is less than 10. Since this variable 
was insignificant to begin with the removal is justified. All results are available upon request. 
